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A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
The internet represents a rapidly evolving set of technologies which is central to the development of a modern economy. Internet Economics: Models, Mechanisms and Management integrates knowledge about internet service design with economic modelling principles (pricing, cost and service models). Chapters highlight specific applications of the internet such as service provisioning, cloud computing, commerce, business security, network externalities, social media and more recent developments such as the Internet of Things (IoT), the industrial internet, data analytics and the use of big data to bring value to commercial ventures. Therefore, readers will have a conceptual and practical framework for understanding the economics of internet infrastructure and service delivery.
This monograph presents and analyzes the optimization, game-theoretic and simulation models of control mechanisms for ecological-economic systems. It is devoted to integrated assessment mechanisms for total risks and losses, penalty mechanisms, risk payment mechanisms, financing and costs compensation mechanisms for risk level reduction, sales mechanisms for risk level quotas, audit mechanisms, mechanisms for expected losses reduction, economic motivation mechanisms, optimization mechanisms for regional environmental (risk level reduction) programs, and mechanisms for authorities' interests coordination. The book is aiming at undergraduate and postgraduate students, as well as at experts in mathematical modeling and control of ecological economic, socioeconomic and organizational systems.
Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century initiated a great debate not just about inequality but also regarding the failures found in the economic models used by theoreticians and practitioners alike. Wealth of Persons offers a totally different perspective that challenges the very terms of the debate. The Great Recession reveals a great existential rift at the core of certain economic reflections, thereby showing the real crisis of the crisis of economics. In the human sciences we have created a kind of "Tower of Babel" where we cannot understand each other any longer. The "breakdowns" occur equally on the personal, social, political, and economic levels. There is a need for an "about-face" in method to restore harmony among dissociated disciplines.
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results.
This monograph focuses on exploring game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text.

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