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Soon after the Oslo accords were signed in September 1993 by Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization, Edward Said predicted that they could not lead to real peace. In these essays, most written for Arab and European newspapers, Said uncovers the political mechanism that advertises reconciliation in the Middle East while keeping peace out of the picture. Said argues that the imbalance in power that forces Palestinians and Arab states to accept the concessions of the United States and Israel prohibits real negotiations and promotes the second-class treatment of Palestinians. He documents what has really gone on in the occupied territories since the signing. He reports worsening conditions for the Palestinians critiques Yasir Arafat's self-interested and oppressive leadership, denounces Israel's refusal to recognize Palestine's past, and—in essays new to this edition—addresses the resulting unrest. In this unflinching cry for civic justice and self-determination, Said promotes not a political agenda but a transcendent alternative: the peaceful coexistence of Arabs and Jews enjoying equal rights and shared citizenship. From the Trade Paperback edition.
This book is about ending guerrilla conflicts in Latin America through political means. It is about peace processes, aimed at securing an end to military hostilities in the context of agreements that touch on some of the principal political, economic, social, and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place. The book presents a carefully structured comparative analysis of six Latin American countries--Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru--which experienced guerrilla warfare that outlasted the end of the Cold War. The book explores in detail the unique constellation of national and international events that allowed some wars to end in negotiated settlement, one to end in virtual defeat of the insurgents, and the others to rage on. The aim of the book is to identify the variables that contribute to the success or failure of a peace dialogue. Though the individual case studies deal with dynamics that have allowed for or impeded successful negotiations, the contributors also examine comparatively such recurrent dilemmas as securing justice for victims of human rights abuses, reforming the military and police forces, and reconstructing the domestic economy. Serving as a bridge between the distinct literatures on democratization in Latin America and on conflict resolution, the book underscores the reciprocal influences that peace processes and democratic transition have on each other, and the ways democratic "space” is created and political participation enhanced by means of a peace dialogue with insurgent forces. The case studies--by country and issue specialists from Latin America, the United States, and Europe--are augmented by commentaries of senior practitioners most directly involved in peace negotiations, including United Nations officials, former peace advisers, and activists from civil society.
Clearly and accessibly written, Dixon provides a lively introduction to the nature and politics of the Northern Ireland conflict and of successive attempts to resolve it. The comprehensively revised 2nd edition has been updated to take account of new information and an entirely new chapter has been added on implementing the Good Friday Agreement.
Following nearly three decades of conflict and a series of failed ceasefire agreements, on 15 August 2005, the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia reached an historic peace agreement to end the fighting and to give Aceh a high degree of genuine autonomy. The catalyst for the talks that produced this agreement was the devastating tsunami of 26 December 2004, which left almost 170,000 dead or missing in Aceh and destroyed most of the populated low-lying areas. Despite the massive destruction, the peace talks were conducted under an intensified military campaign. GAM made a major concession to the talks by announcing early that it was prepared to negotiate an outcome other than complete independence. The Indonesian side, however, under pressure from the military and "nationalists" in Jakarta, pressed for GAM to accept a minor reworking of the status quo. The international community, meanwhile, just pressed for a settlement. In the end, the Indonesian government also compromised, and the two parties reached an agreement that was intended to end the fighting and to address many, if not all, of GAM's outstanding claims. Despite opposition to the talks process, and to compromise, the outcome was increasingly seen both in Jakarta and in Aceh as a "win-win" situation, and as a further significant step in Indonesia's continuing process of reform and democratization. Peace in Aceh offers an insider's personal account of that peace process and is required reading for anyone wishing to understand this troubled province. DR. DAMIEN KINGSBURY is Associate Professor in the School of International and Political Studies and Director of International and Community Development at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. He was political adviser to GAM for the peace talks and assisted in drafting and negotiating key elements of the peace agreement. Dr. Kingsbury has published extensively on Indonesian politics, the military and regional security issues, including The Politics of Indonesia (3rd edition 2005), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (2005), and Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (2003).
Discusses the multitude of negotiations between Israel and Palestine to secure peace in the Middle East, including secret negotiations in Sweden, the meetings at Camp David in 2000, and the peace talks between Israel and Syria.
This book, the third in the series Studies in Peace Politics in the Middle East, is an expert assessment on what went wrong with the Oslo peace process - a process that began in euphoria and degenerated into disaster. The contributors provide a wide-ranging, albeit very different, retrospective of the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace, and analysis of how negotiations should best proceed from here on. Contributors include: Mustafa Abu Sway, Professor and Director of the Islamic Research Center, Al Quds University, an eminent authority on the Islamic position on the Arab-Israeli conflict; Yossi Ben-Aharon, an Israeli ambassador and former Deputy Director General of the Foreign Ministry; Abraham Diskin, former Chairman of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and advisor to several Israeli prime ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Knesset; Manuel Hassassian, Professor of International Relations and Executive Vice-President of Bethlehem University; Aaron D. Miller, Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department; Ron Pundak, who played a decisive role in the secret track of unofficial negotiations that culminated in the Oslo Accords, and advised on the blueprint for Final Status Negotiations; Robert L. Rothstein, Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations at Colgate University; Moshe Ma'oz, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Senior Research Associate of the Truman Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ziad Abu Zayyad, Minister of Jerusalem Affairs of the Palestinian National Authority; and Khalil Shikaki, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. Although the terrorist strategy has greatly increased the psychic insecurity of daily living and the virtual disinitegration of the peace proces that had nearly brought the Palestinians a relatively good settlement at the end of the Clinton admintstration, breaking out of the cycle of violence and retaliation requires knowdge not only of why Oslo failed, but also some preliminary judgments about the complex interactions between Al-Qaeda's terrorist assaults and the windows of opporutnity that may open in the Middle East. Understanding the Oslo process under present cirucmstances is crucial.
Evidence taken before Sub-committee C (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy)
From the early 1970s through the mid-1990s, Northern Ireland was the site of bitter conflict between those struggling for reunification with the rest of Ireland and those wanting the region to remain a part of the United Kingdom. After years of strenuous negotiations, nationalists and unionists came together in 1998 to sign the Good Friday Agreement. Northern Ireland's peace process has been deemed largely successful. Yet remarkably little has been done to assess in a comprehensive fashion what can be learned from it. Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process incorporates recent research that emphasizes the need for civil society and a grassroots approach to peacebuilding while taking into account a variety of perspectives, including neoconservatism and revolutionary analysis. The contributions, which include the reflections of those involved in the negotiation and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, also provide policy prescriptions for modern conflicts. This collection of essays in Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process fills a void by articulating the lessons learned and how—or whether—the peace processes can be applied to other regional conflicts.
One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.
Examines the Palestinian uprising that began in September 2000, discussing its origins, its consequences, the role of the United States, the response of the Israeli government, and the impact on the future of peace in the region.
When conflict, competing identities, and segregation collide; Identity, Segregation and Peace-building in Northern Ireland explores the implications for peace-building in Northern Ireland, and across the globe.
This study demonstrates that Syria's role in the Middle East has been, since 1974, an unabated terrorist war against all attempts to resolve peacefully the Arab-Israeli conflict. Marius Deeb provides evidence that Syria's role in Lebanon, since 1975, has been to perpetuate the conflict among the various Lebanese communities in order to keep its domination of Lebanon.
Madiha Madfai explores Jordan's role in the USA's peacemaking efforts during the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations.
Political stability is a crucial precondition for peace in the Middle East. In The Middle East Peace Process: Vision versus Reality, Joseph Ginat, Edward J. Perkins, and Edwin G. Corr have assembled a comprehensive overview of the complex peace negotiations taking place among Middle Eastern nations to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and forge normal relations between Arab nations and Israel. More than thirty academics and practitioners probe, discuss, and engage themselves with issues concerning the peace process. The volume focuses first on the Oslo Agreement and the Palestinian Track; then addresses Israeli relations with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; and concludes with an examination of relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem. The Middle East Peace Process is the result of the Center for Peace Studies conference “The Peace Process in the Middle East,” cosponsored by the International Program Center at the University of Oklahoma and the University of Haifa in Israel. The volume features a foreword by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan and a preface by David L. Boren, President of the University of Oklahoma.
The objective of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan has been firmly embraced by most of the potential parties to a treaty. However, arriving at an agreement about the sequencing, timing, and prioritization of peace terms is likely to be difficult, given the divergence in the parties' interests and objectives. The U.S. objective in these negotiations should be a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that neither hosts nor collaborates with terrorists.
An interdisciplinary exploration of the visual presence of death in contemporary culture.

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